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Introduction
After the September 11 attacks, Congress hastily passed the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”),1
which made several changes to electronic surveillance law. The Act has
sparked a fierce debate.2 The pros and cons of the USA PATRIOT Act,
Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School; J.D. Yale Law
School. Thanks to Patricia Bellia, Linda Fisher, Chris Hoofnagle, Orin Kerr, Raymond Ku,
Peter Raven-Hansen, Stephen Saltzburg, Paul Schwartz, and Peter Swire for helpful
comments on the manuscript. I would also like to thank Romana Kaleem for excellent
research assistance.
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272.
2 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The
Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 637 (2003); Steven A. Osher, Privacy,
Computers, and the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn’t Dead, but No One Will Insure
It, 54 FLA. L. REV. 521, 542 (2002); Alison A. Bradley, Comment, Extremism in the
Defense of Liberty?: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the
USA Patriot Act, 77 TUL. L. REV. 465, 467 (2002); Susan W. Dean, Comment, Government
Surveillance of Internet Communications: Pen Register and Trap and Trace Law Under the
Patriot Act, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 97, 98 (2003); Michael F. Dowley, Note,
Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA Patriot Act: Is It Possible to Protect
National Security and Privacy at the Same Time? A Constitutional Tug-of-War, 36 SUFFOLK
August 2004 Vol. 72 No. 6
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however, are only one part of a much larger issue: How effective is the law
that regulates electronic surveillance?
Today, technology has given the government an unprecedented ability
to engage in surveillance. New X-ray devices can see through people’s
clothing, amounting to what some call a “virtual strip-search.”3 Thermal
sensors can detect movement and activity via heat patterns.4 Telephone
calls can be wiretapped; places can be “bugged” with hidden recording
devices; and parabolic microphones can record conversations at long
distances.5 A device known as Carnivore developed by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”) can scan through all of the e-mail traffic of an
internet service provider (“ISP”).6 Keystroke logger devices can record
every keystroke typed on one’s computer,7 and these devices can be
installed into a person’s computer by e-mailing a computer virus called
“Magic Lantern.”8 Tracking devices can relay information about a
person’s whereabouts.9 One can trace cell phone calls to a person’s
particular location.10
Surveillance cameras have become ubiquitous. Britain has erected an
elaborate system of video cameras which enable officials to monitor city

U. L. REV. 165, 167 (2002); Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The
USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 934 (2001); David Hardin, Note, The
Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA Patriot Act Amendments
to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 294 (2003); Nathan C.
Henderson, Note, The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct
Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179, 180
(2002); Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA Patriot Act Will Permit Governmental
Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of ‘Intelligence’ Investigations,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2002); Anne Uyeda, Note, The USA Patriot Act May
Infringe on Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. NOTES 1, ¶ 4 (2002), at
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/notes/2002/01_020204_uyeda.php (last visited June 9,
2004).
3 Ivan Amato, Future Tech: Beyond X-ray Vision: Can Big Brother See Right
Through Your Clothes?, DISCOVER, July 2002, at 24; Guy Gugliotta, Tech Companies See
Market for Detection; Security Techniques Offer New Precision, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
2001, at A8.
4 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001).
5 The opening to the movie The Conversation provides an illustration of the use of
parabolic microphones. See THE CONVERSATION (Paramount Studio 1974).
6 See generally E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: U.S. Government Surveillance of
Internet Transmissions, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, § 2 (2001), at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue2/v6i2-a10-Jennings.html (last visited June 9, 2004).
7 See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 574 (D.N.J. 2001).
8 Ted Bridis, FBI Is Building a “Magic Lantern”; Software Would Allow Agency to
Monitor Computer Use, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2001, at A15.
9 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
10 Christine Tatum, Navigators Hit Road in Digital Quest, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2002,
§ 4 at 3.
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streets through closed circuit television.11 Called CCTV, this system has
grown rapidly ever since it was first used in 1994 in response to terrorist
bombings.12 By 2001, according to estimates, Britain had one-half million
surveillance cameras, one for every 120 people.13 The United States has
begun moving toward the British model. In 2002, the U.S. National Park
Service installed surveillance cameras around national monuments in
Washington, D.C.14
Surveillance technology can be a useful law enforcement tool, for it
provides the government with the power to watch people’s activities and
listen to their conversations. These profound powers, however, raise
difficult problems. As with many countries throughout the world, the
United States has enacted a series of laws to balance the benefits and
dangers of surveillance.
Electronic surveillance law in the United States is comprised primarily
of two statutory regimes: (1) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”),15 which is designed to regulate domestic surveillance; and (2)
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”),16 which is
designed to regulate foreign intelligence gathering. While other statutes
provide additional protection, ECPA and FISA are the heart of electronic
surveillance law.
The USA PATRIOT Act made a number of changes in electronic
surveillance law, but the most fundamental problems with the law did not
begin with the USA PATRIOT Act. In this Article, I suggest that
electronic surveillance law suffers from significant problems that predate
the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act indeed worsened some
of these problems, but surveillance law had lost its way long before.
Surveillance law is thus in need of a radical reconstruction; I aim to provide
some guidance to start this endeavor.
In Part II, I discuss the purpose and history of electronic law. In Part
III, I analyze several problems with existing surveillance law. I begin by
focusing on specific difficulties with the scope, standards, and enforcement
mechanisms of the statutes. Next, I examine the more deeply rooted and
11 See generally CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CCTV (1999); Jeffrey Rosen, A Cautionary Tale for a New Age of
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 6 (Magazine).
12 NORRIS & ARMSTRONG, supra note 11; Rosen, supra note 11, at 41.
13 Charles Goldsmith et al., Tuesday’s Attack Forces an Agonizing Decision on
Americans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2001, at A8.
14 David A. Fahrenthold, Cameras to Oversee Festivities for Fourth, WASH. POST,
July 3, 2002, at A1; Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Police Offer Rules for Video Surveillance, WASH.
POST, Apr. 10, 2002, at B1.
15 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848.
16 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2000)).
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systematic problems. I contend that electronic surveillance law is overly
intricate and complex, that it has failed to keep pace in adapting to new
technologies, and that it provides for insufficient judicial and legislative
oversight. In Part IV, I suggest ways in which surveillance law should be
reconstructed to address these problems. Specifically, I recommend a
rather radical solution: Warrants supported by probable cause should be
required for most uses of electronic surveillance. I explain why this
solution best resolves the existing problems with electronic surveillance
law, and I argue that this approach is flexible and practical. Finally, I
recommend that Congress draft a charter regulating the FBI.
I.

The Purpose and History of Electronic Surveillance Law

In order to examine the effectiveness of electronic surveillance law and
the methods by which to improve it, we must first articulate the goals that
we want the law to achieve. At a very general level, the law of electronic
surveillance recognizes two things: that government surveillance is good
and that it is bad. Surveillance is an important law enforcement tool, and it
can be highly effective at solving and preventing crimes. Thus, we want
the government to be able to engage in certain forms of surveillance. But
surveillance is also a very dangerous tool, with profound implications for
our freedom and democracy.
Hence, we also want government
surveillance to be tightly controlled.
Our electronic surveillance law was created in response to specific
problems. It was thus borne out of experience, and it is designed to redress
these problems. In this Part, I discuss the animating problems and concerns
of surveillance law. I examine the costs and benefits of electronic
surveillance as well as the history of how and why surveillance law
developed the way it did.
A.

Surveillance: The Good and the Bad

Electronic surveillance is one of the central tools of modern law
enforcement. It can aid significantly in the investigations of crimes, for it
allows the government to watch and listen to people during their unguarded
moments, when they may speak about their criminal activity. Video
cameras may capture criminals in the act and aid in their identification and
arrest. Surveillance can also assist in preventing crimes because it enables
the government to learn about criminal activity that is afoot and to halt it
before it happens. Few would argue that these are not significant benefits.
Surveillance can also prevent crime in another way. In 1791, Jeremy
Bentham imagined a new architectural design for a prison which he called
the Panopticon.17 As Michel Foucault describes it:
17

(1994).

See DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRIC EYE: THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62
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[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this
tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side
of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of
which extends the whole width of the building . . . . All that is
needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut
up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker
or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe
from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small
captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so
many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone,
perfectly individualized and constantly visible.18
The Panopticon achieves obedience and discipline by having all
prisoners believe they could be watched at any moment. Their fear of
being watched inhibits transgression. Surveillance can thus prevent crime
by making people decide not to engage in it at all. More generally,
surveillance is good because it is a highly effective tool for maintaining
social order. We want to foster a society where people are secure from
theft, vandalism, assault, murder, rape, and terrorism. We thus desire
social control, and surveillance can help achieve that end.
But surveillance is bad for the very same reason. George Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four chronicles a totalitarian government called “Big
Brother” that aims for total social control.19 Everyone is under constant
fear of being watched or overheard, and everything that people do is rigidly
controlled by the government.20 In contrast to the society depicted in
Orwell’s novel, our society aims to be free and democratic, and our
government is a far cry from Big Brother. The goal is not to suppress all
individuality, to force everybody to think and act alike. Our government,
however, has some of the same surveillance capabilities as Big Brother.
And even when the government does not aim for total social control,
surveillance can still impair freedom and democracy.
Surveillance has negative side effects that affect both the observed and
the observers. For the observed, surveillance can lead to self-censorship
and inhibition.21 According to Julie Cohen: “Pervasive monitoring of every
first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland
and the mainstream.”22 Monitoring constrains the “acceptable spectrum of
belief and behavior,” and it results in “a subtle yet fundamental shift in the
18 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 1979) (1975).
19 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 3 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992) (1949).
20 See id.
21 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1260 (1998).
22 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000).
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content of our character, a blunting and blurring of rough edges and sharp
lines.”23 Surveillance “threatens not only to chill the expression of
eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our
aspirations to it.”24 Paul Schwartz argues that surveillance inhibits freedom
of choice, impinging upon self-determination.25 Surveillance rigidifies
one’s past; it is a means of creating a trail of information about a person.
Christopher Slobogin argues that being placed under surveillance impedes
one’s anonymity, inhibits one’s freedom to associate with others, makes
one’s behavior less spontaneous, and alters one’s freedom of movement.26
Surveillance’s inhibitory effects are especially potent when people are
engaging in political protest or dissent. People can face persecution, public
sanction, and blacklisting for their unpopular political beliefs. Surveillance
can make associating with disfavored groups and causes all the more
difficult and precarious.
For the observers, surveillance presents a profound array of powers
that are susceptible to abuse. As Raymond Ku notes, the Framers of the
Constitution were concerned about “unfettered governmental power and
discretion.”27 The Framers were deeply opposed to general warrants and
writs of assistance.28 General warrants “resulted in ‘ransacking’ and
seizure of the personal papers of political dissidents, authors, and printers
of seditious libel.”29 Writs of assistance authorized “sweeping searches and
seizures without any evidentiary basis.”30 As Patrick Henry declared:
“They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights,
or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and rooms, and search,
ransack, and measure, every thing you eat, drink, and wear. They ought to
be restrained within proper bounds.”31 The problem, in short, is with the
23

Id.
Id.
25 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1656 (1999) (“[P]erfected surveillance of naked thought’s digital expression
short-circuits the individual’s own process of decisionmaking.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States,
80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560 (1995).
26 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 237–67 (2002).
27 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founder’s Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (2002).
28 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999); Tracey
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1994).
29 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); see also
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 406
(1995).
30 Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988).
31 3 THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
24
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government having too much power.
Electronic surveillance presents additional problems. It is a sweeping
form of investigatory power. It extends beyond a search, for it records
behavior, social interaction, and everything that a person says and does.
Rather than a targeted query for information, surveillance is often akin to
casting a giant net, which can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond
that which was originally sought. As James Dempsey notes, electronic
surveillance captures a wide range of communications, “whether they are
relevant to the investigation or not, raising concerns about compliance with
the particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment and posing the risk
of general searches.”32 Moreover, unlike a typical search, which is often
performed in a short once-and-done fashion, electronic surveillance
“continues around-the-clock for days or months.”33 Additionally, in a
regular search, the government comes to a suspect’s house and often
searches while the suspect is present; on the other hand, “the usefulness of
electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.”34 As
Justice Douglas observed, wiretapping can become “a dragnet, sweeping in
all conversations within its scope.”35
Dissenting from Lopez v. United States,36 where the Court upheld the
use of a pocket wire recorder to record a conversation, Justice Brennan
observed that surveillance “makes the police omniscient; and police
omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.”37 As Justice
Brandeis observed:
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at
both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between
them upon any subject, although proper, confidential and
privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one
man’s telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of
every other person whom he may call or who may call him. As a
means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are
but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared
with wire-tapping.38
Furthermore, information collected by electronic surveillance can
potentially be abused. Even if abuses are rare or the risk of abuse is low,
the existence of legal protection is comforting and freedom-enhancing.
CONSTITUTION 448–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1974).
32 James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 70 (1997).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
36 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
37 Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475–76 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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People need a degree of control over the government in order to feel free.
Freedom is not just the absence of restraints; it is a mental state, a felt
reality in both structure and sentiment. Like insurance, protections against
surveillance provide a sense of security.
Surveillance gives significant power to the watchers. Part of the harm
is not simply in being watched, but in the lack of control that people have
over the watchers. Surveillance creates the need to worry about the
judgment of the watchers. Will our e-mail be misunderstood? Will our
confidential information be revealed? What will be done with the
information gleaned from surveillance?
Thus, the goal of surveillance law is to ameliorate these problems
while at the same time allowing for effective law enforcement. This can be
accomplished by providing for the oversight of government surveillance,
accountability for abuses and errors, and limits against generalized forms of
surveillance.
B.

The Story of Surveillance Law

Electronic surveillance emerged as early as the telegraph. After the
telegraph was invented in 1844,39 technology to tap into its
communications was developed shortly thereafter. Priscilla Regan notes:
“During the Civil War, the Union and Confederate armies tapped each
other’s telegraph communications to ascertain battle plans and troop
movements.
Rival press organizations tapped each other’s wire
communications in order to be the first to report major news items.”40
Following the Civil War, Congress attempted to obtain telegraph
messages maintained by Western Union for various investigations.41 This
raised quite an outcry.42 Editorials decried the tapping as “an outrage upon
the liberties of the citizen”;43 as a practice that “outrages every man’s sense
of his right to the secrets of his own correspondence”;44 and as “hateful and
repulsive to the people in general.”45 In 1880, Congress considered a bill to
protect the privacy of telegrams.46 Although the bill was abandoned, state
law responded. Several courts quashed subpoenas for telegrams.47 As the
39

See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY
(2000).
40 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1995).
41 See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1978); ELLIS
SMITH, supra note 39, at 69.
42 See SEIPP, supra note 41, at 31.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 35.
45 Id. at 36.
46 Id. at 40.
47 Id.

FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 123
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Missouri Supreme Court stated in quashing a grand jury subpoena for
telegrams: “Such an inquisition, if tolerated, would destroy the usefulness
of this most important and valuable mode of communication.”48 More than
half of the states passed laws to prohibit the disclosure of telegraph
messages by telegraph company employees.49
In the twentieth century, the changing nature of the type of criminal
activity being prosecuted, the rise of organized police forces, and the
development of more sophisticated surveillance technologies led to a
profound increase in law enforcement surveillance. The rise of the mafia
and large-scale crime organizations required law enforcement to find
means to learn about what crimes these groups were planning. The
government began to increase prosecution of certain consensual crimes,
such as gambling, the use of alcohol during Prohibition, and the trafficking
of drugs. Unlike robberies or assaults, which are often reported to the
police, these crimes occurred through transactions in an underground
market. Infiltration into this underworld (undercover work), as well as
surveillance, became key tools to detect these crimes.
In earlier times, policing consisted of amateurs who merely patrolled
rather than investigated.50 But by the twentieth century, police forces
transformed into organized units of professionals.51 The FBI emerged in
the early years of the twentieth century, the brainchild of Attorney General
Charles Bonaparte. In 1907, Bonaparte asked Congress to authorize the
creation of a detective force in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).52 At the
time, the DOJ was borrowing investigators from the Secret Service, and
Bonaparte wanted a small permanent set of investigators to work for him in
the DOJ.53 But he was rebuffed by the House Appropriations Committee.54
Bonaparte again asked Congress in 1908, and members of Congress were
very skeptical of the idea.55 They worried about the detective force
becoming a secret police, prying into the privacy of citizens, growing into
something larger and more unwieldy, and lacking adequate control.56 One
congressman declared:
In my reading of history I recall no instance where a government
perished because of the absence of a secret-service force, but
many there are that perished as a result of the spy system. If
48

Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (1880).
SEIPP, supra note 41, at 65.
50 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1105–06 (2002).
51 Id. at 1105; Stuntz, supra note 29, at 435.
52 CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 111 (1991).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 111–12.
56 Id. at 112.
49
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Anglo-Saxon civilization stands for anything, it is for a
government where the humblest citizen is safeguarded against the
secret activities of the executive of the government.57
Congress rejected Bonaparte’s request and even passed a law
prohibiting the DOJ from borrowing Secret Service agents.58 Before this
law became effective, however, Bonaparte used the DOJ’s discretionary
budget to hire Secret Service agents, and he brought in people from other
parts of the DOJ to form a new subdivision.59 In July 1908, President
Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the subdivision,
which became known as the Bureau of Investigation.60 J. Edgar Hoover
soon took the helm of the Bureau, which was renamed the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”) in 1935.61 The FBI grew dramatically throughout
the rest of the century. When Franklin Roosevelt became President in
1933, the FBI had 353 agents and 422 support staff.62 When Roosevelt
died in 1945, there were 4,380 agents and 7,422 support staff.63
At the time the FBI was being born, the debate over surveillance of
communications was entering a new era. Similar to the story of telegraph
tapping,64 telephone wiretapping technology arose soon after the invention
of the telephone in 1876.65 And similar to what occurred earlier with the
telegraph, the privacy of phone communications became a public concern.
State legislatures responded by passing laws criminalizing wiretapping.66
For example, in 1905, California expanded its 1862 law against
intercepting telegraph messages to include telephone calls.67
In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States,68 the Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to wiretapping.69 The Court
reasoned: “There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”70 Justice Brandeis penned
a powerful dissent, arguing that new technologies required rethinking old57

Id. at 112–13 (quoting Rep. J. Swagar Sherley, D-Ky.).
Id. at 111, 113.
59 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 113; RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE
LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 133 (1987).
60 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 113.
61 Id.
62 RONALD KESSLER, THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE FBI 57 (2002).
63 Id.
64 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
65 REGAN, supra note 40, at 110–11. Telephone wiretapping began in the 1890s.
SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 25 (1959).
66 ELLIS SMITH, supra note 39, at 157.
67 Id.
68 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
69 Id. at 469.
70 Id. at 464.
58
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fashioned notions of the Fourth Amendment: “Subtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the
government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to
obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.”71 A year after
Olmstead, even J. Edgar Hoover testified that “‘while it may not be
illegal . . . [wiretapping] is unethical and it is not permitted under the
regulations by the Attorney General.’”72 Hoover declared that “‘any
employee engaged in wire tapping will be dismissed from the service of the
bureau.’”73
In 1934, six years after Olmstead, Congress passed section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act.74 Under section 605, “no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communications to any person.”75 Section
605, however, was largely ineffective. It was interpreted only to preclude
the introduction of wiretapping evidence in court.76 The FBI could thus
wiretap freely so long as it did not seek to use the evidence at trial. Section
605 also did not apply to the states.
Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, the FBI expanded in
size and in the scope of its surveillance activities. World War II and the
ensuing Cold War enabled the FBI to fortify its powers.77 Presidents
increasingly gave the FBI new authorization to engage in wiretapping.78
During World War II, the FBI received a profoundly expanded authority to
engage in wiretapping and to investigate national security threats.79
Hoover, who once had promised to fire any FBI employee who
wiretapped,80 lavishly ordered wiretapping of hundreds of people, including
71

Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107, 127
(1986) (quoting Department of Justice Appropriations Bill for 1931: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Appropriations, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1930) (testimony of J. Edgar
Hoover, Director of the Bureau of Investigation)).
73 Id.
74 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (2000)).
75 47 U.S.C. § 605.
76 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 260 (3d ed. 2000).
77 See Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background
and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 793, 797–98 (1989).
78 See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 155–65 (1998); Cinquegrana, supra note 77, at 797–98.
79 See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 161–62; William C. Banks & M.E.
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 26–
27 (2000).
80 Fisher, supra note 72, at 127 (citation omitted).
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political enemies, dissidents, Supreme Court Justices, professors,
celebrities, writers, and others.81 Among Hoover’s files were dossiers on
John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, Charlie Chaplin, Marlon Brando,
Muhammad Ali, Albert Einstein, and numerous presidents and members of
Congress.82
Justice William Douglas seemed paranoid when he
complained for years that the Supreme Court was being bugged and
tapped—but he was right.83 The FBI aggressively investigated political
dissenters in a program known as COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence
Program).84 The program was designed to gather information about
political groups viewed as domestic security threats.85 The data was used
to disrupt the lives of the members of these groups, and the FBI’s tactics
included secretly attempting to convince employers to fire targeted
individuals, anonymously informing spouses of affairs to break up
marriages, and trying to induce an IRS investigation to deter individuals
from attending meetings and events.86 Much of COINTELPRO’s activities
were focused on the American Communist Party, but the program extended
to other political groups as well, including members of the Civil Rights
Movement and opponents of the Vietnam War.87 Included among these
individuals was Martin Luther King, Jr., whom Hoover had under extensive
surveillance.88 The FBI surveillance recordings revealed that King was
having extramarital affairs, and the FBI sent copies of the recordings to
King and his wife, threatening that if King failed to commit suicide by a
certain date, the recordings would be released publicly.89
In the late 1960s, the Court and Congress attempted to rein in the
growing power of the executive to engage in electronic surveillance. In
Berger v. New York, the Court struck down portions of New York’s
wiretapping statute and outlined the constitutional criteria for electronic
surveillance.90 In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed Olmstead in United
States v. Katz, declaring that wiretapping was covered by the Fourth

81

KESSLER, supra note 62, at 94, 166, 188.
Id. For more information about Hoover’s files on Albert Einstein, see generally
FRED JEROME, THE EINSTEIN FILE: J. EDGAR HOOVER’S SECRET WAR AGAINST THE WORLD’S
MOST FAMOUS SCIENTIST (2002).
83 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 630.
84 POWERS, supra note 59, at 339.
85 See 2 Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Senate, 94th Cong. vol.2, at 10 (1976)
[hereinafter Church Comm. Report].
86 See id.
87 DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 6–7 (1999);
POWERS, supra note 59, at 339, 422–30.
88 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 140–42.
89 Id. at 126.
90 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967).
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Amendment.91
In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act.92 Almost everyone had disliked section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act.93 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenback
declared it the “worst of all possible solutions.”94 According to Senate
Report 1097, section 605 “serves . . . neither the interests of privacy nor of
law enforcement.”95 The problem with section 605 was that it permitted
private citizens to wiretap but prohibited law enforcement officials from
using evidence of electronic surveillance for even the most serious of
crimes.96 Further, the report stated, “[t]he tremendous scientific and
technological developments that have taken place in the last century have
made possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic
surveillance techniques.”97 The report also noted the need to permit law
enforcement to engage in electronic surveillance to combat serious and
complex crimes performed by “highly organized, structured and formalized
groups of criminal cartels.”98 Berger and Katz were used “as a guide in
drafting Title III.”99 Title III extended the reach of electronic surveillance
law beyond federal officials to state officials and even to private parties.100
Although Title III was an improvement over section 605, it failed to
address national security and foreign intelligence surveillance.101 In Katz, a
debate in dicta arose over whether regular Fourth Amendment procedures
would apply when national security was at stake.102 In his concurrence,
Justice White opined that if the president authorized electronic surveillance
for national security reasons, then the Fourth Amendment should not
require a warrant.103 Justices Douglas and Brennan, in their own
concurrence, attacked White’s claim: “There is, so far as I understand
constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between
91

United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).
Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat.
212 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)).
93 JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
§2.1, at 2–3 (2003).
94 Hearings on Criminal Laws and Procedures Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1966) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach,
Attorney General, United States).
95 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154 (1968).
96 CARR & BELLIA, supra note 93, § 2.1 at 2–3.
97 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154.
98 Id. at 2157.
99 Id. at 2163.
100 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003).
101 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11, at 37 (2002).
102 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967).
103 Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
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types of crimes. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment draws no lines between
various substantive offenses.”104
In 1972, the Court concluded in United States v. United States District
Court105 that, under the Fourth Amendment, the government needed a
warrant to engage in electronic surveillance for domestic criminal
investigations.106 This case is often referred to as the “Keith case,” named
after Judge Damon J. Keith, the federal district judge who originally heard
the matter. The Court, however, also stated that “domestic security
surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from
the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’”107 The Court reasoned that the
“gathering of security intelligence” occurs over a long time period and aims
to prevent future crises.108 Because of these aims, security surveillance
“may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of
crime.”109 Accordingly:
Different standards [for gathering domestic security intelligence]
may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government
for intelligence information and the protected rights of our
citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the
governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen
rights deserving protection.110
Beyond the “domestic aspects of national security,” the Court explicitly
declared it was expressing no opinion about surveillance of “foreign
powers or their agents,” but it noted that warrantless surveillance under
these limited circumstances “may be constitutional.”111
Spurred by the Watergate scandal, Congress formed a special elevenmember committee in 1975 to investigate surveillance abuses over a nearly
forty-year span from 1936 to 1975.112 The committee was led by Senator
Frank Church and was called the Church Committee. Publishing fourteen
volumes of reports and supporting documents, the Committee concluded
that the government had engaged in numerous abuses of surveillance, often

104

Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
106 Id. at 323–24.
107 Id. at 322.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 322–23.
111 Id. at 321–22 & n.20.
112 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 178. Another committee, chaired by Governor
Nelson Rockefeller, was created in 1975 to investigate CIA surveillance in the United
States. The committee report found numerous abuses. Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at
32–33.
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targeting people solely because of their political beliefs.113 Specifically, the
Committee noted:
Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government
agencies and [too] much information has [been] collected. The
Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of
citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those
beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a
hostile foreign power.114
Additionally, the Committee reported, every president from Franklin D.
Roosevelt to Richard M. Nixon improperly used government surveillance
to obtain information about critics and political opponents.115 The
Committee counseled for a strict separation between domestic and foreign
intelligence gathering.116
FISA117 emerged as a response to the Church Committee reports and to
the Keith case. Congress was concerned over surveillance abuses by the
executive branch, a concern inspired by Nixon’s abuse of surveillance
powers under the guise of national security.118 As Senate Report 604
declared: “This legislation is in large measure a response to the revelations
that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security has
been seriously abused.”119 The purpose of FISA was to erect a “secure
framework by which the executive branch could conduct legitimate
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context
of this Nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.”120 FISA
created a distinct regime regulating electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes.
In 1986, Congress amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

113 In addition to electronic surveillance, the Church Committee reported on United
States’s involvement in the assassination of foreign and military leaders as well as foreign
and military intelligence. For the reports and documents relating to surveillance abuses
within the United States, see 1–7 Church Comm. Report, supra note 85. The Church
Committee
reports
are
available
online
at
http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm.
The Committee also
produced a number of additional volumes of reports and documents not cited above. For
more background about the Church Committee, see DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at
178–79; SCHULHOFER, supra note 101, at 60–61; Cinquegrana, supra note 77, at 806–08.
114 2 Church Comm. Report, supra note 85, at 5.
115 Id. at 9–10.
116 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 121.
117 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92 Stat.
1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2000)).
118 Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1386 (1993).
119 S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908.
120 Id. at 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916.
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and Safe Streets Act by passing the ECPA.121 Congress passed ECPA out
of a concern that new technologies were posing an increasing threat to
privacy.122 House Report 647 noted that “[l]egal protection against the
unreasonable use of newer surveillance techniques has not kept pace with
technology.”123 Additionally, Senate Report 541 mentioned that threats to
privacy in these new communications media “may unnecessarily
discourage potential customers from using innovative communications
systems.”124 ECPA extended Title III to cover a greater range of forms of
communication, such as e-mail.125 It also extended protection beyond
communications in transmission to those stored in computer systems.126
Subsequently, ECPA was amended a number of times, although these
amendments made relatively minor changes to the structure of ECPA.
The most substantial changes came after September 11. In an
extremely short time following the September 11 attacks, Congress passed
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.127 The USA PATRIOT Act’s changes to
surveillance law, however, were not directly linked to September 11.
Indeed, when Attorney General John Ashcroft asked the DOJ just a few
days after September 11 for recommendations on potential changes in
surveillance law, “the DOJ had already prepared a comprehensive proposal
for updating the Internet surveillance laws.”128 As Orin Kerr observes,
many of the changes the DOJ proposed had been introduced in Congress on
numerous previous occasions and had failed.129 The Act was thus actually
a DOJ wish list from before September 11.
The Act made numerous changes to ECPA and FISA. Among other
things, the Act created more opportunities for delaying notice of search
warrants, increased the types of subscriber records that could be obtained
from communications service providers, and permitted a nationwide scope
for pen register orders and e-mail search warrants.130 It provided for roving
wiretaps under FISA as well as increased sharing of foreign intelligence
information between law enforcement entities.131 The Act made a number
of other changes as well, which will be discussed later. Some of these
121

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.

1848.
122

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3, 5 (1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16–19 (1986).
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 18.
124 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5.
125 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16.
126 Id.
127 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
128 Kerr, supra note 2, at 637.
129 Id.
130 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, at 341–44.
131 See id., at 343.
123
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changes will sunset on December 31, 2005.132
II.

Electronic Surveillance Law and Its Problems

The USA PATRIOT Act has been strongly criticized for making
surveillance law less protective of privacy. The Act is certainly
troubling,133 but many of its problems are rooted more deeply in the
surveillance law that preceded the Act. The USA PATRIOT Act is
therefore just the tip of a much larger iceberg. We thus need to shift the
focus of the debate from the USA PATRIOT Act to electronic surveillance
law more generally. Engaging in this endeavor requires a basic
understanding of the structure of surveillance law, which primarily consists
of two statutory frameworks: ECPA and FISA. Whereas ECPA regulates
surveillance for domestic purposes (the investigation and prevention of
crimes), FISA regulates the surveillance of foreign agents within the United
States. Since it regulates foreign intelligence gathering, FISA provides a
much looser set of protections than ECPA. In this Part, I examine this twopart regime comprised of ECPA and FISA and assess its problems.
A.

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act

Before analyzing the problems with ECPA, it is necessary to discuss
the basic architecture of the statute. ECPA restructures Title III into three
titles. Title I, known as the Wiretap Act, deals with the interception of
communications that are in transmission.134 Title II, known as the Stored
Communications Act, covers the accessing of stored electronic
communications and records.135 Title III of ECPA, known as the Pen
Register Act, applies to pen registers and trap and trace devices, which
record phone numbers or addressing information (such as the “to” and
“from” lines on e-mail).136
ECPA covers three types of communications: wire, oral, and
electronic. A “wire communication” involves “aural transfer[s],” which are
communications containing the human voice, that travel through wire at

132

USA PATRIOT Act § 224.
Orin Kerr argues that “[t]he Patriot Act did not expand law enforcement powers
dramatically, as its critics have alleged. In fact, the Patriot Act made mostly minor
amendments to the electronic surveillance laws. . . . Several of the most controversial
amendments may actually increase privacy protections, rather than decrease them.” Kerr,
supra note 2, at 608. Kerr goes on to conclude: “The Patriot Act is hardly perfect, but it is
not the Big Brother law that many have portrayed it to be.” Id. Kerr makes a convincing
case that selected portions of the Patriot Act are not problematic, but there are other parts
that Kerr does not examine that are quite troubling. I will discuss some of these parts later.
134 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000).
135 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2000).
136 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2000).
133
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some point during their transmission.137 Another type of communication is
an “oral” one—not to be confused with “aural,” although an oral
communication by definition must also be “aural.”
This is a
communication “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation.”138 This definition seemingly applies to communications
intercepted through bugs or other recording devices that do not involve a
wire transmission. So if the police attempted to place a bug in one’s home
to record one’s dinnertime conversations, this would be an interception of
an oral communication. Finally, there are “electronic communications,”
which are all non-wire and non-oral communications, i.e., signals, images,
and data, that can be transmitted through a wide range of transmission
mediums (wire, as well as radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, etc.).139
The prime example of an electronic communication is an e-mail message.
Each of these types of communications—wire, oral, and electronic—is
protected differently, and sometimes, the same type of communication is
protected differently in different parts of the statutory regime.
I will evaluate each part of ECPA—the Wiretap Act, Stored
Communications Act, and Pen Register Act—by focusing on three main
topics. First, I will discuss the scope of each act—the applicability of the
law to different forms and techniques of surveillance. Second, I will
examine the standards required for the government to obtain judicial
authorization to engage in surveillance. Third, I will look at the
enforcement provisions of each act.
1. The Wiretap Act
Title I, the Wiretap Act, governs communications intercepted while in
transmission. A classic example is a wiretap of a phone conversation.
Suppose that Jack and Jill are talking on the telephone. The government
taps into the line and listens in on the conversation. Because this occurs
while the communication is coursing through the telephone wires, it is
covered by the Wiretap Act.
a. Scope
Although the Wiretap Act is quite protective of privacy, it is also very
limited in scope, and it makes distinctions in types of surveillance that are
quite puzzling. For example, silent video surveillance is not covered under
ECPA.140 Silent video surveillance is not an “aural transfer” because it
137

See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
Id. § 2510(2).
139 See id. § 2510(12).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Biasuci, 786 F.2d 504, 508
138
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does not involve a human voice.141 Such surveillance is not covered as an
electronic communication under the Wiretap Act because it is not
intercepted in transmission.142 If, however, the government were to
intercept video images as they were being transmitted over the Internet, this
would be an interception of an electronic communication under the Wiretap
Act.143 But this is a communication consisting of video images, not the
video surveillance of a communication.
The omission of video surveillance from the Wiretap Act’s scope is
problematic since silent video surveillance presents similar (and sometimes
even greater) dangers and threats to privacy as audio surveillance. As one
court noted:
Television surveillance is identical in its indiscriminate character
to wiretapping and bugging. It is even more invasive of privacy,
just as a strip search is more invasive than a pat-down search, but
it is not more indiscriminate: the microphone is as “dumb” as the
television camera; both devices pick up anything within their
electronic reach, however irrelevant to the investigation.144
As another court observed, “video surveillance can be vastly more intrusive
[than audio surveillance], as demonstrated by the surveillance in this case
that recorded a person masturbating before the hidden camera.”145
An easy way around ECPA’s requirements is thus to install a silent
video camera rather than a bug. So long as the camera doesn’t pick up
audio, all the police need is a skilled lip reader to decipher the
conversations.
Ironically, the generally much less stringent protections of FISA cover
video surveillance. The government must submit “a detailed description of
the nature of the information sought and the type of communications or
activities to be subjected to the surveillance.”146 Moreover, the government
must certify “that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by
normal investigative techniques.”147 Foreign agents therefore receive
protection against silent video surveillance whereas United States citizens
do not.
Another limitation in the Wiretap Act’s scope is its narrow definition
of “interception.” For the Act to apply, a communication must be

(2d Cir. 1986).
141 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18).
142 See id. § 2510(1).
143 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, at 333.
144 United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984).
145 United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1990).
146 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2000).
147 Id. § 1804(a)(7).
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intercepted while in transit.148 The government must access it while it is
actually in the process of traveling to its destination.149 For example,
suppose Jack calls Jill on the telephone. The FBI listens in on a wiretap.
This is clearly covered by the Act. But suppose Jack e-mails Jill a
message. The e-mail travels through the phone wires—just like the
telephone conversation—although it makes a brief temporary stop at Jill’s
ISP, where it waits for Jill to download it. The FBI can access it at the ISP,
where it is no longer in “flight.” It is thus not intercepted and the Wiretap
Act does not apply. For example, in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United
States Secret Service,150 the Secret Service seized a computer at Steve
Jackson Games, Inc., a company that produced role-playing games.151 The
computer was used as an e-mail system for 365 users, and it contained 162
unread e-mail messages.152 Because the e-mail was temporarily sitting on
this computer, it was not intercepted, and the Wiretap Act did not apply.153
The Wiretap Act’s narrow definition of “interception” thus does not
provide much privacy protection for e-mail users. Unlike a telephone
conversation, which can only be intercepted while it is actually traveling
through wires, an e-mail makes a temporary pit stop at the ISP’s server.
Even though it is still traveling from the sender to the recipient, it does not
fall within the definition of “interception.” But this difference seems
technical. Phone conversations and e-mail are both very important means
of communication today, yet phone conversations receive vastly more
protection. E-mail is quickly becoming one of the central modes of
communication in the world and is often used in lieu of the telephone. The
use of e-mail continues to escalate at a staggering pace. In 2000, there
were roughly 505 million e-mail accounts, and the number is expected to
reach 1.2 billion by 2005.154 According to projections, by 2005, over 36
billion e-mails will be sent each day throughout the world.155 Despite these
profound statistics, ECPA treats e-mail like a second-class citizen.
Another problem with the narrow definition of “interception” is
demonstrated in United States v. Scarfo,156 where the FBI used a device
known as a “Key Logger System,” which recorded the defendant’s
keystrokes on his computer to figure out his password.157 Scarfo argued
148

18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000).
Id.
150 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
151 Id. at 458–59.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 461–62.
154 Cindy M. Rice, The TCPA: A Justification for the Prohibition of Spam in 2002, 3
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 375, 376 (2002).
155 Id.
156 United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
157 Id. at 574.
149
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that the keystroke logger was akin to a wiretap and therefore the Wiretap
Act applied.158 According to the court, however, there was no interception
because the key logger did not record keystrokes while Scarfo’s modem
was operating.159 Thus, the keystrokes were not intercepted in transit.160
Indeed, the FBI deliberately programmed the key logger system to stop
recording once the modem started transmitting.161 This seems like an end
run around ECPA based on a technicality. For example, suppose a person
drafts a letter and then e-mails it to another person. Rather than waiting for
the letter to be sent and then intercepting it then, the FBI could simply
capture the keystrokes before the letter is sent, thus escaping from the
protections of the Wiretap Act.
b. Standards
The Wiretap Act requires the government to meet very high standards
in order to obtain authorization to intercept communications. A court order
under the Act provides more protection than an ordinary Fourth
Amendment search warrant, and Orin Kerr refers to it as a “‘super’ search
warrant.”162 The Wiretap Act only permits certain types of high ranking
officials to apply for the warrant.163 In addition to requiring probable
cause, a super warrant requires a specific description of where the
communication will be intercepted, the type of communication, and the
duration of the interception.164 The court order must make sure that the
interception of nonrelevant communications is minimized and that the
surveillance immediately “terminate upon attainment of the authorized
objective.”165 In contrast to a Fourth Amendment warrant, which only lasts
for a short time, however, a Wiretap Act court order can authorize
surveillance for up to thirty days.166 Moreover, although the standards for
authorization are fairly high, they have limited impact because of the
Wiretap Act’s narrow scope.
c. Enforcement
Generally, enforcement under the Wiretap Act is quite strong. The
Wiretap Act provides for high civil penalties—minimum damages of
$10,000 per violation.167 Additionally, wire and oral communications are
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 581.
Id. at 581–82.
Id.
Id.
Kerr, supra note 2, at 621.
18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000).
Id. § 2518.
Id. § 2518(5).
Id.
Id. § 2520(c)(2)(B).
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protected with an exclusionary rule,168 but electronic communications are
not.169 At trial, the result is that a defendant can suppress evidence
obtained by the illegal interception of a phone conversation but not an email. Since e-mail has become a central mode of communication, this
discrepancy is baseless.
2. The Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act (Title II) regulates communications
in “electronic storage.”170 The Stored Communications Act also governs
law enforcement access to subscriber records of various communications
service providers, such as ISPs.171 Therefore, if a communication is being
transmitted from its origin to a destination, the Wiretap Act applies; if it is
stored electronically in a computer, the Stored Communications Act
governs. As discussed later, the Stored Communications Act is much less
protective than the Wiretap Act.
a. Scope
“Electronic storage” is defined as “any temporary, intermediate
storage” that is “incidental” to the communication and “any storage of such
communication by an electronic communications service for purpose of
backup protection of such communication.”172 This definition significantly
limits the scope of the Stored Communications Act. For example, e-mail
sitting on the ISP’s server waiting to be downloaded is in “electronic
storage.” After people download and read their messages, however, they
often retain copies of them on the ISP’s server. For example, I keep many
old e-mail messages in my law school e-mail account’s inbox. I also keep
copies of the messages I send to others in the outbox. Because these
messages are now stored indefinitely, according to the DOJ’s interpretation
(which was drafted by Orin Kerr), the e-mail is no longer in temporary
storage and is “simply a remotely stored file.”173 Therefore, under this
view, it falls outside of much of the Act’s protections.174 Since many
people store their e-mail messages after reading them and the e-mail they
send out, this enables the government to access their communications with
very minimal limitations.
The Stored Communications Act also regulates the government’s
168

Id. § 2518 (10)(a).
Id.
170 Id. § 2510(17).
171 Id. § 2510(17)(B).
172 Id. § 2510(17).
173 COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MANUAL ON SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS § III.B (2001) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
174 But see Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004).
169
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access to customer records maintained by a service provider. The Stored
Communications Act lists certain customer record information that is
protected less stringently than stored communications: the customer’s
name, address, phone numbers, billing records, and types of services the
customer utilized.175 The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the list to include
“records of session times and durations,” “any temporarily assigned
network address,” and “any credit card or bank account number” used for
payment.176
b. Standards
The Stored Communications Act is much less protective than the
Wiretap Act. Whereas the Wiretap Act requires a “super warrant,”177 the
Stored Communications Act requires a range of less restrictive orders.
Regular warrants are required only to obtain the contents of
communications in electronic storage for 180 days or less.178 If
communications are stored over 180 days, the government can access them
with an administrative subpoena, a grand jury subpoena, a trial subpoena,
or a court order.179 There is no requirement for probable cause, only
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds”
to believe communications are “relevant” to the criminal investigation.180
For remotely stored files, such as e-mails that have been downloaded and
read, the DOJ contends that the government can access them with a mere
subpoena,181 a radically different device than a warrant. Subpoenas do not
require probable cause or judicial approval.182 As William Stuntz notes,
federal subpoena power is “akin to a blank check.”183
The government can obtain customer record information by providing
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that . . . the records or other information sought, are relevant and

175

18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§210, 115 Stat. 272 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)).
177 18 U.S.C. § 2518; see also Kerr, supra note 2, at 621.
178 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
179 Id. § 2703(b).
180 Id. § 2703(d). If the government does not want to provide prior notice to the
subscriber that it is seeking the information, it must obtain a warrant. Id. § 2703(b). In a
number of circumstances, however, notice can be delayed for up to three months after
information has been obtained. Id. § 2705.
181 DOJ MANUAL, supra note 173, § III.D.1. The government must provide prior or
delayed notice to the individual. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)–(b)(2).
182 Fisher, supra note 72, at 152.
183 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 864 (2001).
176
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material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”184 ISP records are quite
important because they contain key information that can identify people
using screen names or pseudonyms on the Internet. Thus, a person’s First
Amendment right to speak anonymously is implicated. As the Court has
noted, “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful
discussions of public matters of importance.”185 Accordingly, when private
parties have sought to obtain the identities of anonymous speakers, courts
have required heightened standards for subpoenas.186 Unfortunately, the
Stored Communications Act fails to acknowledge that ISP records
implicate important constitutional rights. It allows the government to
obtain records by merely demonstrating relevance to an ongoing criminal
investigation. As previously discussed, this standard does not rise to the
level of probable cause. The ease of government access to ISP records
creates a host of problems that I have examined elsewhere.187 For the
purposes of this discussion, it suffices to say that the Stored
Communications Act goes astray in assuming that ISP records are not
important enough to deserve greater protection.
c. Enforcement
The Stored Communications Act is enforced with much less stringent
penalties than the Wiretap Act. Whereas Wiretap Act violations have
minimum damages of $10,000, Stored Communications Act violations
carry minimum damages of only $1000.188 Another major problem with
the Stored Communications Act is that it lacks an exclusionary rule. Even
if the police violate the Act blatantly, they can still use surveillance
evidence obtained from such misconduct against a defendant in a criminal
trial. For example, in United States v. Hambrick,189 the police used an
obviously invalid subpoena to obtain ISP records about a pseudonymous
person.190 In United States v. Kennedy,191 the court found that a court order
to obtain the defendant’s ISP records was deficient because the government
failed to articulate the “specific and articulable facts” required to justify the
order.192 Nevertheless, the evidence was admitted in the trial because the
Stored Communications Act has no exclusionary rule.193
184

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
186 See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash.
2001); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
187 See generally Solove, supra note 50.
188 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b).
189 United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999).
190 Id. at 505–06.
191 United States v. Kennedy, 81 F.Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000).
192 Id. at 1109–10.
193 Id. at 1106; Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
185
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Orin Kerr contends that the lack of an exclusionary rule is quite
problematic because the exclusionary rule is a very effective enforcement
device, and without it, “criminal defendants have little incentive to raise
challenges to the government’s Internet surveillance practices.”194 Kerr
notes that when defendants complain about a Stored Communications Act
violation, “the courts generally reject [the defendant’s complaint] without
reaching the merits on the ground that no suppression remedy exists.”195
Due to the lack of an exclusionary rule, violations of the Stored
Communications Act do not receive adequate attention in the courts.
3. The Pen Register Act
The Pen Register Act (Title III of ECPA) regulates the government’s
use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. In Smith v. Maryland,196 the
Court held that pen registers are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.197
A pen register is a device that records the numbers of one’s outgoing phone
calls.198 It produces information akin to that on a phone bill—a list of all
the numbers a person called, and the date, time, and duration of each call.199
A trap and trace device records the numbers of one’s incoming phone
calls.200 In Smith, the Court reasoned that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in this information because the telephone company
has access to it.201 Further, the Court noted, “a pen register differs
significantly from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers
do not acquire the contents of communications.”202 Therefore, pen
registers and trap and trace devices receive no Fourth Amendment
protection at all.203
The Pen Register Act provides some protection of privacy, although,
as I discuss below, the protection is very weak. Under the Act, the
government must obtain a court order to use a pen register or trap and trace
device.204
a. Scope
ECPA largely tracks the distinction made by the Court in Smith v.
194 Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 824 (2003).
195 Id.
196 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
197 Id. at 745–46.
198 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000); Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1.
199 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1.
200 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4).
201 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43.
202 Id. at 741.
203 Id. at 745–46.
204 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a).
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Maryland, between what Kerr calls “envelope” and “content”
information.205 Analogizing to postal mail, Kerr states that “the content
information is the letter itself, stored safely inside its envelope. The
envelope information is the information derived from the outside of the
envelope, including the mailing and return addresses, the stamp and
postmark, and the size and weight of the envelope when sealed.”206 Kerr
notes that Congress “has shown little interest in protecting mere envelope
information” but has “regulated prospective content information very
strictly.”207 Accordingly, only content is regulated under the Wiretap Act
and Stored Communications Act. Envelope information is governed by the
Pen Register Act’s less stringent protections.
This distinction works fine for mail, but it is dubious even in Smith
with pen registers. As Justice Stewart observed in dissent: “The numbers
dialed from a private telephone—although certainly more prosaic than the
conversation itself—are not without ‘content.’. . . [These numbers] easily
could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus
reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.”208 As Justice Marshall
stated in his dissent:
Many individuals, including members of unpopular political
organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may
legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts.
Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than
probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political
affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly
free society.209
As Kerr observes, pen register information can reveal a lot.210 A lengthy
call will suggest that “the two people on opposite ends of the line knew
each other, or at least had something substantial to discuss.”211 It reveals
“activity from within the suspects’ homes that tells the police where they
were, at what time, and how long they spoke.”212
The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of pen registers and
trap and trace devices to apply to addressing information on e-mails (e-mail
headers) and to Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses.213 Previously, pen
205

Kerr, supra note 2, at 611–16.
Id. at 611.
207 Id. at 630.
208 Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210 Kerr, supra note 2, at 643.
211 See id.
212 Id.
213 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§216, 115 Stat. 272, 288-290 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)–(4) (2000)).
206
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registers were defined as devices that recorded “the numbers dialed . . . on
the telephone line.”214 Now, the definition extends to all “dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information” beyond telephone lines to numerous
forms of transmission.215 The effect of this change is that e-mail headers
(the addressing information on e-mail messages), IP addresses, and
Uniform Resource Locators (“URLs”) fall under this definition.
When applied to IP addresses and URLs, the envelope/content
distinction becomes even more fuzzy. An IP address is a unique number
that is assigned to each computer connected to the Internet. Each website,
therefore, has an IP address. On the surface, a list of IP addresses is simply
a list of numbers; but it is actually much more. With a complete listing of
IP addresses, the government can learn quite a lot about a person because it
can trace how that person surfs the Internet. The government can learn the
names of stores at which a person shops, the political organizations a
person finds interesting, a person’s sexual fetishes and fantasies, her health
concerns, and so on.
Perhaps even more revealing are URLs. A URL is a pointer—it points
to the location of particular information on the Internet. In other words, it
indicates where something is located. When we cite to something on the
Web, we are citing to its URL. For example, the following is the URL to
Orin
Kerr’s
webpage:
http://www.law.gwu.edu/faculty/profile.asp?ID=3568.
One can visit Kerr’s webpage by typing the above URL into one’s web
browser and clicking the “Go” button. Therefore, URLs can reveal the
specific information that people are viewing on the Web. URLs can also
contain search terms. So if one does a search on Google for Orin Kerr, she
will
be
directed
to
a
URL
that
reads:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF8&q=orin+kerr. Note that the URL reveals her search: “orin+kerr.” As
Kerr notes, “[w]hether URLs that include search terms and other
websurfing addresses can contain ‘contents’ presents a surprisingly
difficult question.”216
The question is difficult because the
envelope/content distinction is not always clear. In many circumstances, to
adapt Marshall McLuhan, the “envelope” is the “content.”217 Envelope
information can reveal a lot about a person’s private activities, sometimes
as much (and even more) than can content information. Yet, as discussed
below, envelope information receives very little protection in contrast to
content information.218
214

18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216.
216 Kerr, supra note 2, at 645.
217 I am referring to McLuhan’s famous phrase, “the medium is the message.”
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964).
218 See infra Part II.A.3.b.
215
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Kerr, however, argues that envelope information should receive lesser
privacy protection because it “is quite rare for noncontent information to
yield the equivalent of content information.”219 Kerr contends that the
example of Internet search terms in URLs is “misleading,” since “Internet
search terms very well may be contents.”220 Kerr, however, overlooks the
great difficulty in making the envelope/content distinction. Kerr assumes
that a compilation of envelope information is generally less revealing than
content information. However, a person may care more about protecting
the identities of people with whom she communicates than the content of
those communications.
Indeed, the identities of the people one
communicates with implicates freedom of association under the First
Amendment. The difficulty is that the distinction between content and
envelope information does not correlate well to the distinction between
sensitive and innocuous information. Envelope information can be quite
sensitive; content information can be quite innocuous. Admittedly, in
many cases, people do not care very much about maintaining privacy over
the identities of their friends and associates. But it is also true that in many
cases, the contents of communications are not very revealing. Many emails are short messages which do not reveal any deep secrets, and even
Kerr would agree that this should not lessen their protection under the law.
This is because content information has the potential to be quite sensitive—
but this is also the case with envelope information.
b. Standards
The Pen Register Act does not provide much in the way of protection
for envelope information. The standard to obtain a pen register order is
remarkably low. All the government needs to do is certify that “the
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to
an ongoing investigation.”221 Courts do not even review the evidence to
back up the government’s claim. The court must take the government’s
word without question. One court has even called the judicial role
“ministerial in nature.”222 Orders can last up to 60 days.223
Moreover, there are no particularization or minimization
requirements.224 The Act does not specify the nature of the investigation.225
219 Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. __, manuscript 49 n.86
(2004).
220 Id. at manuscript 50 n.86.
221 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
222 United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995); see also DOJ
MANUAL, supra note 173, § IV.B.
223 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c).
224 See id. § 3123(b).
225 See id. § 3122.
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The investigation could be a large scale dragnet or COINTELPRO, but it
does not matter. Furthermore, the use of the pen register must only be
“relevant” to an investigation.226 It is hard to imagine how the government
could fail to make this showing regardless of how illegitimate its desired
use of the pen register might be. In fact, Kerr agrees that the pen register
provision is not protective enough and argues for a “higher threshold to
obtain the court order” and “judicial review of the government’s
application.”227 Kerr also notes, however, that because the Pen Register
Act provides protection where the Fourth Amendment provides none, it is
“primarily a privacy law.”228 Title II is thus actually increasing the
protection, because without Title II, these records could be entirely
unprotected. This is certainly true, but giving limited and ineffective
protection is not necessarily improving the situation in a meaningful way.
Instead, it assigns a legislative stamp of legitimacy on the government’s
obtaining such information. It also gives an illusory judicial stamp of
legitimacy by providing for court orders without even minimal judicial
supervisory power.
c. Enforcement
As with the Stored Communications Act, the Pen Register Act does
not contain an exclusionary rule. Thus, like the Stored Communications
Act, the Pen Register Act does not provide recourse to defendants on whom
the government has illegally collected information.
B.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

FISA creates a different regime for surveillance to obtain “foreign
intelligence” information than the ECPA regime that governs regular
government surveillance.229 The regime created by FISA is designed
primarily for intelligence gathering agencies to regulate how they gain
general intelligence about foreign powers within the borders of the United
States. FISA is very permissive; it provides for expansive surveillance
powers with little judicial supervision. FISA permits electronic surveillance
and covert searches pursuant to court orders, which are reviewed by a
special court of eleven federal district court judges known as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).230 The court meets in secret,
226

Id. § 3122(b)(2).
Kerr, supra note 2, at 639. Kerr suggests “specific and articulable facts” as the
threshold, but this is only one step above the existing standard. Id. In contrast, I believe
that a warrant should be required.
228 Id. at 638.
229 For a more thorough background about the FISA, see Peter P. Swire, The
System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ___ (2004).
230 Originally, there were seven judges on the court, but the USA PATRIOT Act raised
the number to eleven. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
227
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with the government presenting applications for orders ex parte.231 If the
government receives an adverse decision, it can appeal to a three-judge
panel.232
FISA’s protections against surveillance are much looser than those of
the ECPA. Under the ECPA and the Fourth Amendment, surveillance is
only authorized if there is a showing of probable cause that the surveillance
will uncover evidence of criminal activity; under FISA, however, orders
are granted if there is probable cause to believe that the monitored party is
a “foreign power” or “an agent of a foreign power.”233 Unlike the ECPA,
FISA surveillance is therefore not tied to any required showing of a
connection to a criminal investigation. FISA does not have this safeguard
since it is about gathering general intelligence about other countries and
their activities within the United States. FISA orders can last for ninety
days234 as opposed to thirty days for an ECPA order.235
The problem with FISA is its secrecy. Of course, monitoring foreign
agents on United States soil is difficult without secrecy. But as William
Banks and M.E. Bowman observe, “[t]he secrecy that attends FISC
proceedings, and the limitations imposed on judicial review of FISA
surveillance, may insulate unconstitutional surveillance from any effective
sanction.”236 Under FISA, the entire proceedings are held ex parte, with
nobody permitted to argue the opposing side.237 Only the government has
the opportunity to appeal.238 The government thus gets two bites at the
apple, and the courts only hear the government’s side.
This procedure is problematic because there is little to ensure against
abuses of power. Compounding this problem is the fact that FISA
intelligence can be used in domestic criminal trials.239 Ordinarily, in a
domestic criminal trial, surveillance evidence must be obtained through the
procedures of ECPA. But if information is obtained under the less
stringent FISA provisions, it can still be used for the prosecution of
domestic crimes.
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000)). For more
details about the workings of the FISC, see generally Benjamin Wittes, Inside America’s
Most Secretive Court, 143 N.J. L.J. 777 (1996).
231 50 U.S.C. § 1093(a) (2000).
232 Id. § 1803(b).
233 Id. § 1805(a).
234 Id. § 1805(e).
235 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
236 Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 87; see also Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving
FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113
Yale L.J. 179, 188 (2003).
237 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
238 See 18 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
239 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, (manuscript at 341).
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Because FISA surveillance power is much broader and more loosely
regulated than the ECPA, what prevents the government from using it in
lieu of ECPA to prosecute regular crimes? The bulwark against such uses
is FISA’s limited applicability, for FISA applies only when the government
aims to gather foreign intelligence, not when the government is
investigating a domestic crime.
The USA PATRIOT Act, however, expanded FISA’s applicability.
Previously, FISA applied only when “the purpose” of the investigation was
to gather foreign intelligence; the USA PATRIOT Act enlarged FISA’s
scope to apply when foreign intelligence gathering was “a significant
purpose” of the investigation.240 This seemingly subtle change has
potentially dramatic ramifications. By changing the language from “the
purpose” to “a significant purpose,” foreign intelligence gathering no
longer needs to be the primary purpose of the surveillance.241 The
government can now rely on loose FISA protections even when foreign
intelligence gathering is only one of many goals.
In light of this change, Ashcroft altered the minimization procedures of
FISA. FISA requires that when conducting foreign intelligence gathering,
the government must implement procedures to minimize the gathering of
information about United States citizens.242 These procedures prevent the
broad powers of FISA from being used for ordinary domestic criminal
investigations. In one type of minimization procedure, investigators
establish an “information screening wall,” in which officials not involved
in the criminal investigation review FISA surveillance and pass along only
information that will be relevant to the criminal investigation. In 2002,
Ashcroft revised the minimization procedures, virtually eliminating the
screening walls. The FISC reviewed these procedures and rejected them.243
According to the court, the “2002 procedures appear to be designed to
amend the law and substitute the FISA for Title III electronic
surveillance.”244 But the three-judge FISA review court reversed.245 In the
first case ever appealed from the FISC, the review court declared that by
changing FISA by using the words “a significant purpose,” the USA
PATRIOT Act “eliminated any justification for the FISC to balance the
relative weight the government places on criminal prosecution as compared

240 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
204, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000)).
241 Id. (emphasis added).
242 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2000).
243 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 625 (Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002).
244 Id. at 623.
245 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720 (Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002).
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to other counterintelligence responses.”246 Therefore, if the government
“articulates a broader objective than criminal prosecution—such as
stopping an ongoing conspiracy—and includes other potential nonprosecutorial responses, the government meets the statutory test.”247 Only
if the “government’s sole objective [is] merely to gain evidence of past
criminal conduct . . . the application should be denied.”248
This ruling underscores the problematic nature of the USA PATRIOT
Act’s amendments to FISA. Government investigations can have a large
scope and multiple purposes. Especially in cases involving terrorism, the
line between foreign intelligence gathering and domestic law enforcement
is often blurred. Since FISA surveillance information can be used in
domestic criminal trials, FISA increasingly can become a tool for domestic
law enforcement and an end run around the protections of ECPA.249
Expanding the scope of FISA makes it more likely that government will
use the FISA regime to conduct widespread surveillance with very scant
legal protections.
C.

The Overarching Problems

The problems discussed above consist of gaps, lapses in protection,
inadequate standards for obtaining authorization to engage in surveillance,
and weak enforcement devices. Some contend that electronic surveillance
law will work quite effectively if its glitches are repaired. Orin Kerr, for
example, gives the Stored Communications Act a grade of “B” and
suggests a few modifications to the statute.250 While some problems with
could be patched, this would merely be a temporary fix because electronic
surveillance law has some larger, more overarching difficulties. There are
three general problems that should be addressed in order to reach a more
long-lasting and far-reaching solution: (1) surveillance law is overly
complex and confusing; (2) it fails to quickly respond and adapt to new
technology; and (3) it fails to provide sufficient oversight of the executive
branch from both the judicial and legislative branches.
246

Id. at 735.
Id.
248 Id.
249 The USA PATRIOT Act’s expansion of FISA brings into question Kerr’s assertion
that the Act is not much of a Big Brother law. Kerr, supra note 2, at 608. Kerr focuses on
only a few specific parts of the USA PATRIOT Act that are not as problematic as some
critics contend; the fact that some provisions are nonproblematic cannot counterbalance the
rather dangerous change in FISA—indeed, Kerr even concedes in a footnote that “some
provisions of the Patriot Act may prove to have serious negative consequences for privacy
and civil liberties.” Id. at 625 n.75. Kerr mentions the FISA changes as “particularly
notable in this regard.” Id. Unfortunately, these provisions are notable enough to refute
Kerr’s general conclusion that the Patriot Act is relatively benign.
250 See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act—And a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ___, manuscript 85 (2004).
247
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1. Rocket Science
A central problem with surveillance law is its profound complexity.
When reprinted in Marc Rotenberg’s Privacy Law Sourcebook, in a normal
font and page size, the ECPA weighs in at fifty-seven pages.251 The FISA
extends for more than forty pages.252 There are a myriad of different terms
with complicated definitions. The statute zigzags with dozens of crossreferences. As cataloged by Orin Kerr, it contains at least seven different
legal threshold requirements for government surveillance, including
subpoenas, different types of court orders, and different kinds of
warrants.253
ECPA also provides different protections depending upon how the
government accesses a particular communication. The Wiretap Act covers
communications intercepted in transmission. The Stored Communications
Act provides different protection for communications accessed in computer
storage. Communications are also protected differently depending upon
how long they are stored. Accessing the customer records of a
communications service presents another set of rules. Yet another group of
rules governs the accessing of routing information about a communication.
And so on.
Kerr, who can probably recite the ECPA by memory, and perhaps even
in verse, admits that it is “surprisingly difficult to understand.”254 Kerr
notes that “courts, legislators, and even legal scholars have had a very hard
time understanding the method behind the madness of the [Stored
Communications Act of ECPA].”255 He states that the “law of electronic
surveillance is famously complex, if not entirely impenetrable.”256 In
numerous articles, Kerr has elucidated the complexities of the law, giving
us countless charts and tables. But alas, all the exegesis Kerr can produce
will only help us so much. The intricacy of electronic surveillance law is
remarkable because it is supposed to apply not just to the FBI, but to state
and local police—and even to private citizens. Given its complexity,
however, it is unfair to expect these varying groups to comprehend what
they can and cannot do. Indeed, even courts have struggled with
understanding the statute. Courts have described surveillance law as
caught up in a “fog,”257 “convoluted,”258 “fraught with trip wires,”259 and

251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

MARC ROTENBERG, PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 162–219 (2002).
Id. at 88–128.
See Kerr, supra note 2, at 620–21.
Kerr, supra note 250, at manuscript 1.
Id. at manuscript 2.
Kerr, supra note 194, at 820.
Briggs v. Am. Air Filter, 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998).
Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1543 (5th Cir. 1994).
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“confusing and uncertain.”260 If one is not willing to study ECPA like a
biblical scholar studies the Bible, there is little hope of figuring out ECPA.
2. Difficulty in Adapting to New Technology
Electronic surveillance law has not kept pace with the staggering
growth of technology. As discussed earlier, the law currently makes
antiquated distinctions that often do not protect what is most important.
Electronic surveillance law has lagged behind technological developments
and has not been responsive to new surveillance technologies.
Despite the development of the Internet, e-mail, and the dizzying array
of other twentieth century technologies, there have only been five major
attempts at shaping electronic surveillance law—in 1934 with section 605
of the Federal Communications Act,261 in 1968 with Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,262 in 1978 with FISA,263 in
1986 with ECPA,264 and in 2001 with the USA PATRIOT Act.265 While
ECPA has been amended between 1986 and 2001, Kerr notes that these
“subsequent changes have merely nibbled around the edges of the law.”266
Thus, major revisions to the law occur in fifteen to forty year intervals.
Even with foresight, the law is bound to be lagging behind technological
developments, especially given the profound specificity and detail of the
current statutory regime.
The most notable problem in this regard is the law’s failure to keep
pace with the breathtaking development of the Internet. In 1989, less than
90,000 computers were connected to the Internet.267 The number increased
to one million by 1993 and to over nine million by 1996.268 According to
projections, there will be over 720 million Internet users by 2005.269
260

Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (2000)).
262 Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat.
212 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)).
263 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92 Stat.
1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2000)).
264 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986).
265 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272.
266 Kerr, supra note 194, at 814.
267 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
268 Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925,
930 (2001).
269 See Louis U. Gasparini, The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction: Traditional
Jurisprudence for the Twenty-First Century Under the New York CPLR, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 191, 194 (2001).
261

SURVEILLANCE-FINAL.DOC

2004]

Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law

9/30/2004 9:03 PM

1735

Despite these dramatic changes since the passage of ECPA in 1986,
Congress has failed to engage in a major revision of the law. Under this
state of affairs, law enforcement cleverly employs new technologies to try
to avoid triggering ECPA.270 Often, these technologies are quite invasive,
but the debate seems to turn on technicalities—whether the surveillance fits
into ECPA’s framework. This invites a technological rat race, in which
law enforcement uses new technologies designed to fit within ECPA’s less
stringent provisions or to fall entirely outside of ECPA’s scope.
Moreover, new surveillance technologies are often used before
Congress has had a chance to study them, as was the case with Carnivore.
In 2000, the Wall Street Journal reported that since 1999, the FBI had been
using Carnivore, a device installed on ISP servers to intercept e-mail and
instant messaging information.271 The FBI contends that Carnivore is akin
to a pen register, but critics charge that it actually has some features that
resemble wiretaps.272 Regardless of who is right on this issue, an important
concern has been neglected—the FBI had been using this new device
before it had been fully studied and debated.
In another example, the Key Logger System, as examined in United
States v. Scarfo,273 was used before being critically examined. The Key
Logger System was a device the FBI developed that could be secretly
installed into one’s computer to log all of a person’s keystrokes.274 News
reports disclosed that the FBI had also developed a second keystroke
logging device called “Magic Lantern” that could be sent surreptitiously
into a person’s computer like a computer virus.275 Even though Carnivore,
the Key Logger System, and Magic Lantern were developed with electronic
surveillance law in mind, this is not enough. Just because these devices
may fit within the law does not mean that they do not pose new dangers.
Even if such devices fit within the law technically, it is not clear that they
correspond with the law’s spirit. Lost amid the labyrinthian task of
applying ECPA’s complex provisions is the question of whether new
technologies contravene the appropriate balance between effective law
enforcement and privacy.
Currently, the focus is on following the dictates of a law developed
before the rise of the Internet and e-mail rather than ensuring that the law
responds to advancements in technology and provides effective law
enforcement tools without stifling individual privacy. Although Congress
has updated ECPA on numerous occasions, it has done so in relatively
270

See supra notes 157–161.
Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI’s Wiretaps to Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL
ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3.
272 Id.
273 United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
274 Id. at 574.
275 Bridis, supra note 8.
271

SURVEILLANCE-FINAL.DOC

1736

9/30/2004 9:03 PM

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 72:1701

minor ways and has failed to address many difficult questions.
Moreover, the FBI has been developing and using new surveillance
technologies without discussing them publicly. As one FBI spokesperson
said: “It’s completely inappropriate [to discuss new surveillance
technologies]. Why would we? That would defeat the whole purpose of
surveillance.”276 But as Raymond Ku aptly observes, the public should
play a role in determining the scope of the executive branch’s power.277
Unfortunately, Ku notes, the use of surveillance technology is often “left
entirely to the discretion of law enforcement.”278 In a self-governing
democracy, it is hard to justify the secret deployment and use of
surveillance technology on United States citizens without affording
adequate public discussion about the costs and benefits of these new
technologies. Electronic surveillance law does not adequately ensure for
such discussion by the people directly or through their representatives in
Congress.
3. Inadequate Judicial and Legislative Oversight
Under many parts of electronic surveillance law, there is insufficient
legislative and judicial oversight. Congress loosely engages in oversight of
law enforcement surveillance, only occasionally becoming directly
involved. For example, when Congress learned about Carnivore, it held
hearings to discuss the pros and cons of the device.279 Another example is
the Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness (“TIA”)
program, run by John Poindexter, which, in 2002, aimed to gather
extensive information about American citizens for use in profiling for
terrorists.280 The media strongly criticized the program. William Safire
wrote a vociferous editorial in the New York Times charging that
Poindexter “is determined to break down the wall between commercial
snooping and secret government intrusion. . . . [H]e has been given a $200
million budget to create computer dossiers on 300 million Americans.”281
In January 2003, the Senate added an amendment to a spending bill to deny
funding for TIA until the Department submitted a report about the program
for Congress to study.282 Subsequently, the Senate prohibited funding for
the program in another bill.283 Only in cases that receive significant media
276 Sean Marciniak, Web Privacy Services Complicate Feds’ Job, WALL ST. J., July 3,
2003, at B4.
277 Ku, supra note 27, at 1357.
278 Id. at 1358.
279 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, at 365.
280 William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35.
281 Id.
282 See Cheryl Bolen, Senate Withholds Data-Mining Funds Until DOD Addresses
Privacy, Rights Issues, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Jan. 27, 2003).
283 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
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attention will Congress become involved. Indeed, although Congress
curtailed TIA, similar data-mining endeavors continue to take place
because they have received less publicity.284
Oversight is also lacking in the reporting system for electronic
surveillance. The Wiretap Act requires the government to submit reports
about wiretapping activity to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, which are then transmitted to Congress.285 No such reports are
required under the Stored Communications Act. Moreover, as Charles
Kennedy and Peter Swire point out, there is little congressional supervision
over state wiretaps.286 The majority of approved wiretap applications are at
the state rather than the federal level, and only half of the states report
statistics about their wiretap orders.287 As a result, Congress often does not
learn about new surveillance technologies until after they are deployed.
Many surveillance technologies remain unstudied and without judicial
supervision. The FBI is largely under the supervision of the executive
branch; but unlike federal agencies, the FBI does not have enabling
legislation that establishes its jurisdiction and powers. Therefore, oversight
often is turned over to the judicial branch. Unfortunately, electronic
surveillance law has very lax standards that often do not give the judiciary
sufficient involvement or ability to circumscribe the use of surveillance.
Moreover, electronic surveillance law does not provide for enough
oversight of the FBI by the judicial and legislative branches. Unlike other
government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the FBI does not have enabling
legislation that defines its powers and jurisdiction. Instead, many of the
FBI’s surveillance practices are governed by guidelines established by the
Attorney General. In 1976, in response to the growing awareness about the
FBI’s checkered history of abuses, Attorney General Edward Levi crafted
guidelines for the FBI to safeguard against surveillance that could affect
First Amendment activities.288 The Levi Guidelines provided specific
limits on the types of investigative activities in which the FBI could
engage.289 FBI agents could use undercover agents, engage in surveillance
of political activities, and undertake other invasive investigative techniques

INFORMATION AGE (forthcoming 2004).
284 See id.
285 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2000).
286 Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic Surveillance
After September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 972 (2003).
287 See id. at 972–73.
288 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 68–69. The Guidelines were called
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES
(1976). FBI Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 521–60 (1976) [hereinafter Levi Guidelines].
289 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 68–69.
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only if pursuant to “investigation” authorized under the guidelines.290
Investigations could be initiated when FBI agents had “specific and
articulable facts” creating a reason to believe that a person was involved in
violent activities in order to conduct an investigation.291
Under subsequent presidential administrations, these guidelines have
been made less restrictive.292 In 1983, Attorney General William French
Smith revised the Levi Guidelines.293 The Smith Guidelines lowered the
threshold standard for initiating an investigation to “when the facts or
circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in
an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly
or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States.”294 Thus, the threshold changed
from the standard of “specific and articulable facts” to the looser standard
of “reasonable indication.”
The Smith Guidelines stated that the
“reasonable indication” standard is “substantially lower than probable
cause,” and that it “does not require specific facts or circumstances
indicating a past, current, or impending violation. There must be an
objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is
insufficient.”295 In 1989, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh revised the
guidelines again, although the changes were minor.296
In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft made profound changes to
the guidelines. Under both the Levi and Smith Guidelines, the FBI was
restricted from monitoring public events and gathering information about
people’s First Amendment activities unless it was related to an
investigation. As discussed above, the Smith Guidelines lowered the
standard to initiate an investigation, but there was still a threshold before
the FBI could begin to engage in these activities. Ashcroft’s revised
guidelines allow the FBI to gather information and mine the Internet for
data without any requirement that it relate to criminal activity.297
290

Levi Guidelines, supra note 288, at 22.
Id.
292 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 69–70; David M. Park, Note, ReExamining the Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations of Domestic Groups,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 769, 772–73 (1997); Mitchell S. Rubin, Note, The FBI and Dissidents: A
First Amendment Analysis of Attorney General Smith’s 1983 FBI Guidelines on Domestic
Security Investigations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (1985). For more background about
the guidelines, see generally John T. Elliff, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI
Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1984).
293 See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS (1983).
294 Id. § III.B.1.a.
295 Id. § II.C.1.
296 See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS § II.C.1 (1989),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/generalcrimea.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
297 See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
291
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Accordingly, the FBI can collect any “publicly available information” and
can “carry out general topical research, including conducting online
searches and accessing online sites and forums.”298 These new guidelines
apply not just to terrorism, but to federal crimes in general.299
Despite the significance of these changes, it is unclear what, if
anything, electronic surveillance law has to say about them. These changes
took place through executive fiat rather than through legislative discussion
or debate. They were not subjected to any checks by the judicial or
legislative branches.
By and large the responsibility for keeping government surveillance
under control has been delegated to the judiciary. Unfortunately, in many
instances, electronic surveillance law provides very weak standards for the
judiciary to authorize the surveillance. As discussed above, many
provisions in the Stored Communications Act and Pen Register Act fall
dramatically short of requiring probable cause, individualized suspicion, or
minimization procedures. At times, the judicial role appears to be little
more than a rubber stamp.300 With such a limited role, problems with
government surveillance applications can go undetected. The FISA court
in its only published opinion of May 17, 2002, noted that the government
had admitted it erred in about seventy-five FISA applications, which
included making false statements about the nature of the investigation and
the sharing of the information.301 Had the government not admitted the
errors, it is unlikely that they would ever have been discovered.
In sum, electronic surveillance law has not established an adequate
system of checks and balances on executive power. Congress updates the
law from time to time, and occasionally becomes involved, but often, the
law is left to drift. Congress needs to play a greater role in monitoring the
executive branch, and electronic surveillance law must afford the judiciary
with more meaningful oversight.

ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS § VI
(2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004). For more
information about data mining and the Ashcroft Guidelines, see Solove, supra note 50, at
1096–97.
298 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS , supra note 297, § VI.B.1.
299 SCHULHOFER, supra note 101, at 58.
300 As Paul Schwartz notes, electronic surveillance orders are rarely denied. Between
1968 and 1996, judges rejected only twenty-eight applications for surveillance orders out of
20,000. See Paul M. Schwartz, German and U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal
Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 793–94
(2003).
301 See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218
F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 (Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002).
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III. Reconstruction
Many of the problems with electronic surveillance law stem from its
rigid, Byzantine structure, which makes a myriad of distinctions that
quickly become antiquated as technology evolves. The result is that the
law ends up with lapses in protection. The degree of protection against
certain forms of surveillance often does not turn on how problematic or
invasive it is, but on the technicalities of how the surveillance fits into the
law’s structure. In this Part, I suggest two solutions. First, I propose a
broad rule that warrants should be required for most instances of electronic
surveillance. Second, I contend that Congress should enact a legislative
charter to regulate the FBI. Both solutions I recommend are designed to
maintain a better system of checks and balances by giving the judicial and
legislative branches a greater role in monitoring and constraining the
surveillance activities of the executive branch. As the Church Committee
noted, “The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a
prolonged period of time were due in large measure to the fact that the
system of checks and balances—created in our Constitution to limit abuse
of Governmental power—was seldom applied to the intelligence
community.”302 Presidents, Attorneys General, and other high-ranking
executive officials have historically provided “broad mandates” and
“vague” guidance to intelligence agencies that led to “excessive or
improper intelligence activity.”303 Electronic surveillance law thus must be
reconstructed to increase legislative and judicial oversight.
A.

A Warrant Rule for Electronic Surveillance

We need a surveillance law that is flexible enough to respond to
emerging technologies. A better approach would be more sweeping.304 I
contend that for most uses of electronic surveillance, warrants supported by
probable cause should be required.305 This should be the general rule, with
specific exceptions authorizing access under less strict standards
enumerated in the statute. This approach has the virtue of simplicity.
Additionally, all violations should be enforced by an exclusionary rule.
Warrants under the law could have a duration of thirty days, as often
electronic surveillance must take place over a longer time period than a
regular search or seizure.
302

2 Church Comm. Report, supra note 85, at 14.
Id.
304 I will not discuss the rules to govern surveillance by private parties. These rules
may need to be different, as the dangers and harms resulting from private party surveillance
are not identical to those of government surveillance.
305 My approach attempts to shift the defaults in a somewhat similar way to how
Raymond Ku suggests that Fourth Amendment analysis be altered. He argues that Congress
should authorize the government’s use of technology by statute for it to be considered
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Ku, supra note 27, at 1374–75.
303

SURVEILLANCE-FINAL.DOC

2004]

Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law

9/30/2004 9:03 PM

1741

Critics of warrants might point out that they are cumbersome because
probable cause is a higher standard than the existing standards under much
of federal surveillance law. Warrants, however, serve several important
functions. First, they are an effective way of checking the power of law
enforcement entities and of circumscribing the government’s investigation
power.306 As discussed in Part II, the central problems of surveillance are
that it will chill individual freedom and political activity, and that it can
lead to excessive exercises of executive power. James Madison captured
the heart of the problem when he wrote:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controuls on government would be necessary. In framing
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government
to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to
controul itself.307
In other words, Madison’s concern can be captured with the famous
question: Who will watch the watchers? Madison’s solution was to
separate the power of the government into different branches so they could
check each other.308
Warrants force law enforcement officials to justify their exercises of
power.309 As Justice Douglas explained for the Court:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search
warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor
to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done
so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that
privacy in order to enforce the law.310
Second, warrants protect against sweeping dragnet investigations. The
Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the government demonstrate that
there be individualized suspicion protects against the risk that innocent
people will be searched. It also prevents the government from engaging in
“fishing expeditions.”311 This is why a warrant must describe with
306

Solove, supra note 50, at 1127.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
308 Id.
309 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1, 17 (1991).
310 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
311 Fisher, supra note 72, at 115 (“The spirit and letter of the fourth amendment
counselled against the belief that Congress intended to authorize a ‘fishing expedition’ into
307
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“particular[ity] . . . the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”312
Third, warrants prevent hindsight bias because they require the courts
to balance privacy and law enforcement needs prior to the search.313 This
prevents the results of the search from tainting the court’s decision.
Some might claim that warrants are ineffective because judges
frequently grant warrant applications. Christopher Slobogin argues,
however, that warrants raise the “standard of care” of law enforcement
officials, forcing them to “document their requests for authorization.”314
Warrants thus force law enforcement officials to be certain that a search is
really necessary. The high rate of granting warrants may be a reflection of
warrants doing their job efficiently by having law enforcement officials
avoid making overreaching requests to search in the first place.
What makes warrants such an effective compromise is that they do not
constitute an absolute bar to the activities of law enforcement. Warrants
merely ensure that law enforcement officials focus on particular individuals
and that they are given adequate independent oversight.
Of course, there will need to be exceptions from this general rule.
Specific electronic devices that do not pose difficulties (such as regular
cameras) should be exempted from this requirement. Another exception
could apply if a communication is made directly to a government agent.
Certain voluntary disclosures of communications to the government could
also be exempted. Thus, if a person receives an e-mail from Osama Bin
Laden by mistake, she can forward it on to the government. Other
exceptions will also need to be made.
The key difference in this approach is that it refocuses the debate. The
discussion will be over the specific instances where warrants are too
cumbersome, rather than over technicalities. As technology continues to
develop, the burden should be on law enforcement officials to convince
Congress that a new device does not threaten individual privacy and that
they should be authorized to use it with less than a warrant. The problem
with the current law is that the FBI can try out new technologies in secret.
Unless these technologies are reported to the public, which sometimes
sparks an outcry, then there will be little pressure on Congress to
investigate them and determine whether to enact protections. If the burden
is placed on law enforcement to lobby Congress to use new technology,
this would allow necessary debate and discussion about the costs and
benefits of these technologies to occur.
What makes this simple approach preferable is that it is more
private papers on the possibility that they may disclose a crime.”).
312 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
313 Solove, supra note 50, at 1127.
314 Slobogin, supra note 309, at 17.
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adaptable to changing technology than the highly technical provisions of
much of current wiretap law. It allows law enforcement to engage in
surveillance while keeping it circumscribed and accountable.
One might object that warrants are not feasible to achieve the purposes
of electronic surveillance, especially in cases of national security. The
Keith Court noted that “domestic security surveillance may involve
different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of
‘ordinary crime.’”315 In particular, national security surveillance is often
not aimed at finding out about who perpetrated past crimes; it is often
prospective, designed to glean information about future threats. Keith
suggested that the traditional Fourth Amendment warrant and probable
cause requirements might not be compatible with the aims of such
surveillance and that “[d]ifferent standards” may be constitutional if they
are “reasonable.”316 This language in Keith suggests one of two
alternatives to my proposal for warrants. First, one could generally support
my approach but carve out an exception for cases involving national
security, where less stringent requirements than warrants and probable
cause would be required. Second, one could contend more broadly that
warrants should not be required for electronic surveillance and that a
standard of “reasonableness” should suffice.
Regarding an exception for national security, such a rule could
threaten to practically eviscerate most protection against electronic
surveillance. “National security” has often been abused as a justification
not only for surveillance, but also for maintaining the secrecy of
government records as well as violating the civil liberties of citizens. The
Japanese Internment, as well as many of the abuses chronicled by the
Church Committee, were justified in the name of national security.317 As
the court noted in United States v. Ehrlichman,318 the Watergate burglary
was an example of the misuse of “national security” powers: “The danger
of leaving delicate decisions of propriety and probable cause to those
actually assigned to ferret out ‘national security’ information is patent, and
is indeed illustrated by the intrusion undertaken in this case . . . .”319 The
government has often raised national security concerns to conceal
embarrassing and scandalous documents from the public—documents
which often turned out to be harmless, such as the Pentagon Papers.320
315

United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
Id. at 322–23.
317 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 121.
318 United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
319 Id. at 926.
320 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); A CULTURE OF
SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW (Athan G. Theoharis
ed., 1998). Attorney General John Mitchell wrote to the New York Times, stating that the
Pentagon Papers “‘will cause irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United
316
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Beyond abusive invocations of national security, the line between national
security and regular criminal activities is very blurry, especially in an age
of terrorism. What precisely is “national security”? Is a mass murderer on
the loose a national security issue? Some have even argued that drug
trafficking is a national security issue.321 Justice Brennan aptly observed
that “the concept of military necessity is seductively broad, and has a
dangerous plasticity.”322 Because of these problems, a national security
exception to the warrant requirement should not be made.
An even broader approach is to apply a “reasonableness” standard in
lieu of the warrant requirement. Akhil Amar argues that the Fourth
Amendment has long been misinterpreted to require the use of warrants
supported by probable cause for searches and seizures.323 Reasonableness,
Amar contends, is what the Fourth Amendment requires.324 Setting aside
the question of whether this is the correct interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, should electronic surveillance law adopt a reasonableness
standard as a policy matter?325 I submit that the answer should be an
emphatic “no.” The standard of “reasonableness” is a rather toothless one.
For administrative, school, and employment searches, the Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment merely requires that a search be
“reasonable.”326 In a vast majority of applications of this standard—from
searching employee offices and files, searching a student’s purse at school,
testing student athletes for drugs, and testing all students engaged in
extracurricular activities for drugs—the Court has concluded that the search
was reasonable.327 Since the reasonableness standard has proven to be
States.’” STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1017 (3d ed. 2002) (quoting
Attorney General John Mitchell). The Pentagon Papers revealed that the government had
misled the public about the origin of United States involvement in Vietnam. See id. at 1013.
321 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 78 (discussing the trend of classifying the drug
war as a national security issue).
322 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
323 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 31 (1997).
324 Id. I have critiqued Amar’s views more extensively elsewhere. See Solove, supra
note 50, at 1124–28.
325 In an interesting proposal regarding the FISA, Nola Breglio recommends that FISA
orders be issued not by the secret FISC, but by regular Article III courts. See Breglio, supra
note 236. Additionally, Breglio contends that the standard for foreign intelligence
surveillance should be one of “reasonableness,” which should be determined post hoc, after
the surveillance has taken place. See id. at 211–14. In addition to the problems with the
reasonableness standard discussed below, a post hoc review will suffer from extreme
hindsight bias.
326 According to the doctrine, warrantless searches and seizures without probable cause
do not violate the Fourth Amendment if “special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (citations omitted).
327 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (drug testing of all
students engaged in extracurricular activities was “reasonable”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (drug testing of student athletes was “reasonable”);
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quite weak in practice, it will not afford sufficient protection against the use
of electronic surveillance.
The warrant and probable cause requirements are not incompatible
with surveillance designed to detect prospective threats. Probable cause
exists “where the facts and circumstances within [law enforcement
officials’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”328
Such a requirement would prohibit surveillance based upon mere
conjecture, naked suspicion, race or nationality, religious affiliation, or
political speech. It would not, however, require that the government
investigate only previously completed crimes. The planning of future
crimes, especially terrorism, is itself a crime, most likely conspiracy or
attempt. Therefore, the government could obtain a warrant to engage in
electronic surveillance if it had “reasonably trustworthy information” that a
future crime was being discussed between conspirators or being planned.
The warrant rule would prevent dragnet surveillance designed to listen in
broadly on people’s conversations—most likely people from disfavored
groups—in the hope of hearing some suspicious chatter.
The approach I recommend does not apply to the FISA. The FISA, as
it was originally conceived before being altered by the USA PATRIOT
Act, aimed to allow for foreign intelligence gathering, which is different
from criminal investigations. Foreign intelligence gathering enables the
government to pursue counterintelligence activities—to monitor foreign
agents working in the United States, to investigate spies, and so on.329
These purposes are quite different from ordinary criminal cases, as the
primary goal of FISA surveillance is to gather data, not to deal with crimes.
This is why the FISA required that the primary purpose for the surveillance
be intelligence gathering. The USA PATRIOT Act loosened this
requirement, which is a troubling development since much surveillance in
today’s world of terrorism has a dual purpose—it involves both intelligence
gathering and investigating criminal activity. The USA PATRIOT Act also
weakened the wall that existed to prevent intelligence gathering from being
used as a pretext to gather criminal evidence outside of the stricter ECPA
regime. In the old version of FISA, the wall would allow evidence gleaned
from a bona fide intelligence operation that revealed evidence of criminal
activity to be used in a criminal prosecution. But a wall was erected to
prevent the pretextual use of FISA for criminal investigation purposes. I
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of employee’s office and files may be
“reasonable”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346–47 (1985) (search of student’s
purse at school was “reasonable”).
328 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (citations omitted).
329 Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. ___, manuscript 33 (2004).
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recommend that FISA be returned to its pre–USA PATRIOT Act state.
The old FISA, and the procedures developed in light of it at the DOJ,
provide a compromise solution that would allow for the surveillance of
foreign agents, yet prevent the FISA from being abused for criminal
investigations.330
B.

A Legislative Charter for the FBI

Another important component of a regulatory regime for government
surveillance is a legislative charter for the FBI. The FBI wields a
tremendous amount of power and it should be placed under greater control
by Congress. Today, the FBI has about 11,000 agents and 16,000 support
staff; it has 56 field offices, 400 satellite offices, and 40 foreign liaison
posts.331 Despite its vast size, extensive and expanding responsibilities, and
profound technological capabilities, the FBI lacks a legislative charter.332
A charter defining the FBI’s scope and powers as well as requiring
more regular congressional oversight would go a long way to ensuring
against the terrible abuses of the FBI’s past. A detailed proposal for such a
charter is beyond the scope of this Article. The bulk of such a charter,
however, could be composed by codifying existing internal FBI Guidelines
into law. The Church Committee recommended a legislative charter to
govern intelligence gathering activities, but many of the Committee’s
proposals were put into operation through executive orders and
guidelines.333 Executive orders and Attorney General Guidelines are the
“primary source of authority for national security surveillance.”334
Unfortunately, executive orders and guidelines can all be changed by
executive fiat, as demonstrated by Ashcroft’s substantial revision to the
guidelines in 2002.335 Moreover, the Attorney General Guidelines are not
judicially enforceable.336 The problem with the current system is that it
330 Under the old FISA approach, the foreign intelligence exception to a warrant
applies until the primary purpose of the surveillance ceases to be for foreign intelligence.
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980); see also DYCUS ET
AL., supra note 320, at 655.
331 FBI,
GENERAL
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/faqs/faqsone.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2003).
332 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 698. The closest thing to a statutory
authorization for the FBI is 28 U.S.C. § 533 (2000), which gives the Attorney General the
authority to appoint officials to detect and prosecute crimes and to conduct investigations of
the Department of Justice and Department of State. DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 698.
333 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 464; Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 34–
35. President Ford responded to the Committee by issuing Executive Order No. 11,905.
DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 464. Ford’s order was superseded with President Carter’s
Executive Order No. 12,036. Id. President Reagan replaced Carter’s order with Executive
Order No. 12,333. Id.
334 Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 74.
335 See supra notes 297–299 and accompanying text.
336 DYCUS ET AL, supra note 320, at 712. There is one exception. In Alliance to End
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relies extensively on self-regulation by the executive branch. Much of this
regulation has been effective, but it can too readily be changed in times of
crisis without debate or discussion. Codifying the internal executive
regulations of the FBI would also allow for public input into the process.
The FBI is a very powerful arm of the executive branch, and if we believe
in separation of powers, then it is imperative that the legislative branch, not
the executive alone, become involved in the regulation of the FBI. The
guidelines should be judicially enforceable to ensure that they are strictly
followed.
I recommend that the original FBI guidelines, under Attorney General
Levi, should be used as the foundation for a legislative charter for the FBI.
The Levi Guidelines were crafted to prevent the abuses chronicled by the
Church Committee, and they provide strong limits on the use of
surveillance directed at free speech and political activities.337 The threshold
standards of the Levi Guidelines are more meaningful than the watereddown versions employed in subsequent revisions. The Levi threshold
standards are not insurmountable—they are a practical compromise
between privacy and effective law enforcement that safeguards against
abuses.
Additionally, the charter should require Congress to undertake an
extensive assessment of intelligence activities at five- to ten-year intervals.
This assessment would be similar in scope to the Church Committee
Report. The Church Committee performed a profoundly valuable service,
exposing and memorializing surveillance abuses that occurred over a
period of about forty years. This kind of thorough accounting of the often
clandestine activities of governmental intelligence agencies should not be
an isolated undertaking.
Conclusion
Currently, Congress is considering whether certain changes to
surveillance law made by the USA PATRIOT Act should sunset in 2005.
Congress should take this opportunity to reconsider electronic surveillance
law more generally. Merely rolling back the USA PATRIOT Act changes
will not address the most serious failings of electronic surveillance law.
Tweaks and patches will not be sufficient—a more radical reconstruction is
sorely needed.

Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 1984), the FBI agreed as part
of a settlement that the Guidelines would be judicially enforceable for the plaintiffs.
337 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 68–69.

